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I. SETTING THE STAGE
In August, 1990, the producer of "Miss Saigon," the hit London musical
decided to cancel its Broadway production because the U.S.-based actors'
union denied permission for the English lead actor to perform the play
in New York.' Actors' Equity, the union, issued a statement that it could
not "appear to condone the casting of a Caucasian in the role of a Eur-
asian '." 2 The conflict between the union and the producer produced a cause
c~l~bre debated in the theater community, in the press, and inside Actors'
Equity itself. A week after its initial decision, the union reversed itself,
saying it had "applied an honest and moral principle in an inappropriate
manner."
3 After weeks of negotiations securing complete casting freedom
to the producer, plans for the play revived, but the issue continued to
produce controversy and wide media coverage for months thereafter.
* Professor, Harvard Law School. This lecture was presented to Cleveland-
Marshall Law School as part of its distinguished lecture program. I would like
to thank Joe Singer, Anita Allen, Jack Balkin, Larry Blum, Mary Ann Glendon,
Moshe Halbertal, Frank Michelman, Nell Minow, Avi Soifer, Elizabeth V. Spel-
man, Zipporah Wiseman, Peter Lefkowitz, David Pointer, and David Wiseman
for their help with this piece.
IMervyn Rothstein, Producer Cancels "Miss Saigon"; 140 Members Challenge
Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at C15. The union has authority over all per-
formers appearing on Broadway. Actors from foreign countries need union ap-
proval before appearing unless they are considered British "stars." Michael
Kuchwara, 'Miss Saigon' Canceled Over Casting of White Actor, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 9, 1990, at p. 79. The union said it had not reached the question whether
the British actor was a "star" for these purposes. Id.
2 Id.
3 Mervyn Rothstein, Equity Council Approves Accord on 'Miss Saigon', N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1990, at C14.
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The context of the controversy included advance ticket sales of $25
million;4 the recent election of an African-American mayor concerned
about both remedying discrimination and preserving the theater indus-
try;5 the political attack on controversial art by conservative American
officials seeking to control the uses of federal subsidies;6 an emerging
public conflict over attention to "politically correct" claims about racism,
sexism, and homophobia, 7 and the United States Supreme Court's re-
pudiation of most public affirmative action programs.8
For me, there was one more context for the debate. As I read about the
casting of "Miss Saigon," I could not help but draw connections to another
"casting" debate, closer to my home.9 The ongoing debate over why law
school faculties remain largely white and male intensified with Professor
Derrick Bell's decision to take a leave without pay until Harvard Law
School hired for its tenure-track a female law professor of color. Further
heightening the issue at Harvard, a group of law students sued the school
and claimed that discriminatory hiring practices hindered their educa-
tion. 10 Both "Miss Saigon" and Harvard Law School generated arguments
4Mervyn Rothstein, Dinkins Offers to Help in 'Miss Saigon' Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at C3. According to one observer, only the large advance
sales explain the public controversy over Equity's initial objection to casting a
Caucasian. See Robert Armin, Miss Saigon: Not the Final Word, THEATER WEEK,
Sept. 10-16, 1990 at 37-38. ("If Miss Saigon did not have such a tremendous
advance sale ... very few people outside of the theatrical profession would have
batted an eye over Equity's decision.")
I Mervyn Rothstein, Equity Will Reconsider Miss Saigon' Dectsion, IN. Y. 'IMES,
Aug. 10, 1990, at C3.
6 Frank Rich explicitly analogized the National Endowment for the Arts denial
of funding to artists depicting homoerotic and sexually explicit images with the
Actors' Equity decision in the 'Miss Saigon' case. Frank Rich, Jonathan Pryce,
"Miss Saigon" and Equity's Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at C1.
'See generally Louis Menand, Illiberalisms, NEW YORKER, May 20, 1991, at
10 (reviewing Dinesh D'Souza's ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND
SEX ON CAMPUS); See also VIRGINIA DURR, OUTSIDE THE MAGIC CIRCLE (Hollinger
F. Barnard ed. 1985) (discussing racism in the United States).
I See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). But see
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
' Making a similar connection to underscore his own viewpoint, Robert Bru-
stein, the director of the American Repertory Theater in Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, commented: "Everyone's in the casting business. You have to cast a black
woman in a law school as a law professor.... You have to cast Asians, homosex-
uals, everyone, in order to get sufficiently diverse multicultural representation.
That is what Yeats called the 'mad intellect of democracy,' thinking that democ-
racy means there has to be equal representation for everything that happens."
Richard Bernstein, The Arts Catch Up with a Society in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 1990, § 2, at 12. (quoting Robert Brustein).
1o See Debbie Howlett, Harvard Law Hit with Bias Suit, USA TODAY, Nov. 21,
1990, at 3A. The plaintiffs, an unincorporated student organization, claimed that
Harvard Law School's faculty hiring practices discriminated against minority
groups and thus violated a state antidiscrimination statute and a state statute
guaranteeing equal rights in the context of contracts. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the case. Memorandum of Decision and Orders on
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about merit and about symbolism, about overcoming discrimination and
about risks of new forms of discrimination, about fairness and about
representation. In both contexts, one side argued that there must be
someone hired from the minority community while the other side main-
tained that hiring must be color-blind and merit-based.
Many arguments in the law school hiring context echoed those gen-
erated by the "Miss Saigon" casting controversy; see if they sound familiar
to you. Jonathan Pryce, the white English actor cast by the producer for
the role, commented: "What is appropriate is that the best person for the
job play the role, and I think it's completely valid that I play the role."',2
Translated for law school hiring, this argument sounds like: "what is
appropriate is that the best person for the job get the job; excellence must
not be sacrificed for other purposes."
About "Miss Saigon," Frank Rich commented: "By refusing to permit
a white actor to play a Eurasian role, Equity makes a mockery of the
hard-won principles of non-traditional casting and practices a hypocritical
reverse racism."' 3 Similarly, though perhaps less vividly, professors have
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Other Pending Motions, Harvard Law School
Coalition for Civil Rights v. The President and Fellows of Harvard College, No.
90-7904-B (Superior Court Feb. 22, 1991). Curiously, in light of the themes of
this article, the decision largely rested on conclusions that the students could not
represent the interests of minority members who might be victims of employment
discrimination by the law school. Thus, the court ruled that the plaintiff group
lacked legal capacity to sue; that it lacked standing to assert the claims of any
person wrongfully denied employment by the school; and that it could not assert
a breach of contract regarding existing contracts between the school and its
faculty, nor a breach regarding nonexistent contracts with minority candidates.
Id.
11 Two law professors have commented from contrasting perspectives on the
analogy between the "Miss Saigon" controversy and minority preference policy
in comparative licensing proceedings undertaken by the Federal Communications
Commission. Compare Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Con-
cepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 121-122 n.82 (1990) with Patricia Wil-
liams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times; 104 HARV.
L. REV. 525 (1990).
For a thorough and provocative treatment of the law school hiring issue, see
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Aca-
demia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705.
12 Mervyn Rothstein, Producer Cancel's 'Miss Saigon'; 140 Member Challenge
Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at C15.
13 Frank Rich, Jonathan Pryce, "Miss Saigon" and Equity's Decision, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at Cl, C3. He continued: "This is a policy that if applied
with an even hand would bar Laurence Olivier's Othello, Pearl Bailey's Dolly
Levi, and the appearances of Morgan Freeman in 'The Taming of the Shrew' and
Denzel Washington in 'Richard III...'" Id. at C3. Some warn that cross-race
casting should proceed asymmetrically and allows historically excluded groups
the chance to play the majority of existing roles without allowing historically
privileged groups opportunities to play the relatively more scarce minority roles.
See Ellen Holly, Why the Furor Over "Miss Saigon" Won't Fade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 1990, § 2, at 7 (criticizing the casting of whites into the occasional roles calling
for minorities).
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argued that demanding the appointment of a professor because of her sex
and race contravenes hard-fought principles of equal opportunity and
color-blindness. 14 Even more directly on point were arguments over a
hiring controversy at Harvard a few years back: when white civil rights
activists and black civil rights lawyers were invited as visitors to teach
a course on civil rights, students protested the school's failure to hire a
full-time faculty member of color for such a course. In its defense, the
Harvard administration challenged the idea that a white person who had
devoted his life to the subject could not teach about civil rights.1 5
In contrast, Ellen Holly, a black actress, commented about the "Miss
Saigon" casting debate:
Racism in America today is nothing so crass as mere hatred of
a person's skin color. It is rather an affliction of so many cen-
turies' duration that it permeates institutions to the point of
becoming indivisible from them. Only when the darker races
attempt to break out of the bind - and inconvenience whites
in the process - do whites even perceive racism as an issue.
Only when a white is asked to vacate a role on racial grounds
does the matter become a front-page issue. 16
Rich, and others, also argued that opposing the casting of one lead part in
"Miss Saigon" was counterproductive because the production of the play would
itself open 34 Asian, black, and Hispanic roles in the musical, and not all, he
claimed, would be minor roles. Rich, supra at C3. Shirley Sun responded to this
argument: "One wonders if anyone would have advised black actors to be content
with minor roles in the current Broadway production of August Wilson's "Piano
Lesson" if a Caucasian actor had been cast in the lead as Boy Willie." Shirley
Sun, For Asians Denied Asian Roles, "Artistic Freedom" Is No Comfort, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, § 2, at 7. Still a different response would query why Rich
or anyone else thinks that the other roles depicting racial minorities are any
more likely to be cast with nonwhite actors, or any more appropriately so, and
if so, why.
14 See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1745 (1989); Abigail M. Thernstrom, On the Scarcity of Black Professors,
COMMENTARY 22, 25 (July 1990). Cf. Kathleen Sullivan, Speech to the Harvard
Law School Visiting Committee, March 15, 1991 (discussing reporter Lisa Olsen's
charge of sexual harassment in the men's locker room of the Patriot football team
and acknowledging that some people don't think a woman reporter belonged in
the men's locker room. Sullivan then noted that on that theory, perhaps women
would not belong at Harvard Law School, either.)
"5 To round out the analogy, one could simultaneously have argued that just
as African Americans teach contracts and tax, whites should be allowed to teach
about race relations. Yet this argument has the awkward implication that teach-
ing contracts and tax are "white" roles and teaching about race relations is a
"minority" role.
16 Ellen Holly, Why the Furor Over "Miss Saigon" Won't Fade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 1990, § 2, at 7, 27. Similar points appeared in testimony before the New York
City Commission on Human Rights. Al Levine, a Hofstra University law professor,
testified that "an all-black cast of 'Oh, Kay!' does not eliminate a history of racial
discrimination." Reprinted in Thomas Walsh, NYC Hearings on Theater Discrim-
ination Uncover Anger & Demands for Action, BACK STAGE Dec. 14, 1990, at 1
(quoting A] Levine). Bernard Marsh, an actor, criticized the virtually all-white
casts of contemporary Broadway productions and noted, "We're trained to believe
an actor is an actor. We've found that it only applied when the actor is white."
Id. (quoting Bernard Marsh).
[Vol. 39:269
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Analogously, in law school faculties around the country, individuals argue
about institutionalized racism. Some observers argue that implicit pref-
erences for people who are part of the "old-boy network" go unnoticed,
while preferences for someone from a traditionally excluded group pro-
voke an uproar. Advocates for change assert that only actual results in
hiring should count as evidence that historic exclusions are being over-
come.
From this point of view, what may look like a preference for a member
of a racial minority is really an effort to counteract a preference for whites.
But another argument for preferring members of racial minorities simply
views them as specially qualified people for the job at hand. In the wake
of the "Miss Saigon" controversy, the distinguished playwright August
Wilson defended his demand for a black director for the film production
of one of his plays. He explained:
"We are an African people who have been here since the early
17th century. We have a different way of responding to the
world. We have different ideas about religion, different man-
ners of social intercourse. We have different ideas about style,
about language. We have different aesthetics. Someone who
does not share the specifics of a culture remains an outsider,
no matter how astute a student or how well-meaning their
intentions. I declined a white director not on the basis of race
but on the basis of culture. White directors are not qualified
for the job.1 7
Similarly, a professor of color is needed, many argue, because that
person will bring cultural perspectives otherwise missing from the law
school community. That perspective will enrich the classroom, the schol-
arship, the counseling of students who share that background, and the
counseling of students who do not share that background. In addition,
some law school faculty members may conclude that their school should
hire an Hispanic professor, because the increasing numbers of Hispanic
students need the knowledge held by that person and because white,
Asian, and African-American students need to see a Hispanic person in
the respected position at the head of the class. Hence the slogan, "No
education without representation."'
An additional argument arises in the law school hiring debate. Pro-
fessors are role models, and only members of historically excluded groups
can serve adequately as role models for students of those groups, goes
this variation of the argument. 9 Some who support this position maintain
somewhat differently that only a variety of role models can serve the
needs of all students. Thus the special pedagogical needs of students who
17 August Wilson, 'I Want a Black Director', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1990, at A25;
August Wilson, I Don't Want to Hire Nobody Just 'Cause They're Black, SPIN, Oct.
1990, at 70; 71.
18 Student Posters, Bulletin Boards, Harvard Law School, 1990.
,9 Anita Allen explores the role model arguments with attention to her personal
experiences while identifying the persistence of merit even within role model
claims. See Anita Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 22
(1990/1991).
1991]
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
are members of minority groups are distinct from and yet complimentary
to the benefit for all students from diversity among the faculty. Further,
in a distributive justice sense, the focus on race and sex in hiring should
serve to shift resources, including the resource of academic attention, to
new agendas for legal scholarship and teaching.20 Finally, the presence
of actors of color in a play can encourage young people of color to consider
acting as a career just as professors of color can inspire non-white students
to pursue academic careers.
Most striking to me is the parallel between those who find the entire
framework of debate unacceptable, whether in the contexts of "Miss Sai-
gon" casting or law school hiring. Playwright David Henry Hwang, one
of the first to complain about the casting choice in "Miss Saigon," later
said that he could not choose between minority casting and the producer's
right to cast whom he wants because that is "like asking me to pick
between my father and my mother; I can't. It's real hard for me to pick
between artistic freedom on the one hand and discrimination on the
other."21 Similarly, some law professors argue that the choice cannot be
between excellence and diversity because both are critical. In addition,
many reject the implication that schools must trade or sacrifice some
excellence in order to achieve diversity.
One person struggling with these tensions concluded that at least the
debate over the casting in "Miss Saigon" brought the chronic difficulties
facing actors of color to public attention. Shirley Sun, director, producer
and writer of the recent film, "Iron and Silk," defended the public attention
provoked by the stance of Actors' Equity toward "Miss Saigon." She wrote,
"a minority group should not intentionally be excluded from [a Broadway
play] with impunity . .. 'Artistic freedom' should not be used to exclude
any group. If the stage is a sublime place where any actor can play any
role, why can't an Asian or Asian-American play a Eurasian role?" 22 If
20 This may be more like the notions of political representation in legislatures,
and the implicit idea here is that the representatives will redirect resources. See
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Aca-
demia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 728-30.
21 Kevin Kelly, M. Butterfly, Miss Saigon and Mr. Hwang, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
9, 1990, at B89. Journalist Kelly in turn commented that Hwang "might be
considered Confucian. 'The superior man,' Confucius says, '... does not set his
mind for anything or against anything; what is right he will follow."' Id.
22 Shirley Sun, For Asians Denied Asian Roles, 'Artistic Freedom' is No Comfort,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, § 2, at 7. She concludes:
While black actors have progressed to playing Shakespeare-current ex-
amples include Denzel Washington as Richard III and Morgan Freeman as
Petruchio in 'Taming of the Shrew' in this summer's Shakespeare in the
Park program-it is erroneous to use the black example to generalize about
Asian-Americans. Clearly, Asian-Americans have not yet reached the stage
where they are taken seriously enough to be able to play themselves in
leading roles. Much less do they have the opportunity to be cast in non-
Asian roles. Until Asian-American actors can play Hamlet or Richard III,
it is ludicrous to talk about reverse racism.
Id. at 27.
[Vol. 39:269
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theater offers the possibility that actors can entice audiences to suspend
their disbelief and be transported by crafted illusions, why cannot more
actors have this chance to transport the audience?23 The casting decision
in "Miss Saigon," then was not about matching the actor's race with the
character's race, but about the magical creation of an illusion of reality
Especially noteworthy here is the reminder that different groups of people of
color have different experiences dealing with racism. At the same time, this
comment elides the difference between the actors and the roles they play by
characterizing playing Asian characters as playing "themselves." I was most
struck on this front by an experimental reading of the transcript of a documentary
film by Frederick Wiseman staged by actors of the American Repertory Theater
in Cambridge, Ma. 1988. The actors had never seen the movie, and they performed
the scenes and then they joined the audience in watching the scenes from the
movie. Some uncanny resemblances occurred, as when one actress decided to play
with a rubber band nervously and then turned to watched the film clip which
showed the actual woman who uttered the lines in real life was chewing gum
nervously as she spoke. But more striking were the differences. One of the real
characters had made some racist statements; in the film clip, he seemed demonic
and worked up. The actor reading the lines chose instead to read them flat, with
little affect. The audience agreed that this effort by the actor was believable and
more chilling than the racist statements made by the actual person who had
originated the lines.
Perhaps the point about "depicting ourselves" may be somewhat different if
the question involves a actor with disabilities. Perhaps there is a kind of knowl-
edge and ease that is enabled only by having the disability, or perhaps there is
a possibility of believable portrayal that the actor with a disability uniquely has
to offer. It is tempting to argue that so few have the chance to play any theatrical
role or be taken seriously for any role of a character without a disability. When
the few roles calling for a person with disabilities are given out to someone without
those disabilities, the rare opportunity to perform is eclipsed, and prejudice or
ignorance about persons with disabilities may be the reason for the decision not
to cast or even audition an actor who has a disability. See Andrea Wolper, Beyond
Tradition: Ethnic and Disabled Actors Assess the Present, Plan for the Future,
BACK STAGE, Feb. 23, 1990, at 1A, 29 (producers tell an actress who uses a
wheelchair not to audition for the role of a person in a wheelchair because they
feared she would not be strong or well enough). But this relative rarity of good
roles resembles the situation for Asian, African-American, Hispanic actors, fe-
male actors over the age of 40.
23 One idealized view has the actor becoming the character: HANNA FEINCHEL
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967), at 26:
Ordinarily the actor in a play does not claim or even pretend to be the
authorized representative of anyone. He does not pretend to act on authority
of Hamlet, but to be Hamlet. His entire manner and appearance are directed
to creating the illusion that this is someone else, someone whom he is
playing or, as we say, representing on the stage. Id. at 26.
Even less romantic views of acting celebrate the opportunity to convince an
audience of an imagined world or set of possibilities.
The relative scarcity of such opportunities to create illusions through acting
may be especially painful when a member of one minority group is cast as a
member of another minority group. "Seret Scott, a black actress, became emo-
tional as she told of times when she'd agreed to play Latinos, Asian-Americans
and Native Americans. By complying, she said, she took jobs away from actresses
from those ethnic groups." Allan Wallach, Casting Color Aside; Must Nonwhites
be Limited to Roles Written Specifically for Them?, NEWSDAY, July 1, 1990, Part
1I, at 4-5.
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by whichever actor gains the chance to play the role. 24 Some producers
specifically endorse cross-racial casting not only to give the best candidate
the chance with the role but also to enrich and challenge the plays with
the different dimensions that casting choices may afford.25 Similar ar-
24 Curiously, few people considered the possibility of casting a Eurasian actor
for the role; both white and Asian commentators suggested that the Eurasian
character would have to be played either as Asian or European. Thus, the white
actor cast in the role, Jonathan Pryce, declared that "If the character is half Asian
and half European, you've got to drop down on one side of the fence or the other,
and I'm choosing to drop down on the European side." Mervyn Rothstein, Producer
Cancels 'Miss Saigon' 140 Members Challenge Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990,
at C15.
No one, to my knowledge, argued that it would be best to have only people
from a group unlike the one to which the character belongs play the roles in order
to challenge stereotypes. This approach could broaden the range of actors and
audience and break out of simply enacting actual lived experience. Yet analogous
argument in a legal context is unattractive: consider the claim that members of
a given group should not be allowed to sit as judges or jurors in cases involving
members of that group because they lack the requisite objectivity. For strong
reasons rejecting such arguments see: Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp.
1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Intl. Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.Pa. 1974).
25 The Non-Traditional Casting Project defines four types of non-traditional
casting: (1) societal, in which non-white and/or female actors are cast in roles of
characters with their ethnicity or sex; (2) cross-cultural, which transposes an
entire play to a different culture; (3) conceptual, which casts an ethnic, female,
or disabled actor in a role to give it greater resonance; and (4) casting of the best
actor for a role even if this departs from the script. See generally Andrea Wolper,
Non-Traditional Casting: Definitions & Guidelines, Backtions & Guidelines, BACK
STAGE Feb. 23, 1990, at 29.
Zelda Fichandler, the producing director at the Arena Stage Theater in Wash-
ington, D.C., has maintained that theater's task, "while not stretching credulity
to the breaking point, is to stretch it as far as we can." Zelda Fichandler, A
Theater Should Live on the Cutting Edge, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 13, 1990, at
A22. Under her leadership, that theater has pursued non-traditional casting:
actors are cast to play roles not written for someone of their race or ethnicity.
See generally Zelda Fichandler, Casting For a Different Truth, AMERICAN THEATER
May 1988, at 8.
A multiracial cast in a performance of Thornton Wilder's "Our Town" directed
by Douglas Wager at the Arena Stage led one reviewer to comment:
standing in a mass on the stage, the cast's racial mix has seemed utterly
unexceptional, but as the actors begin to step into character, it's suddenly
startling. Emily and George, the two young lovers who will court, marry,
and experience tragedy together, have both been cast with white performers,
but each has been given a black sibling. George's father is Hispanic and
speaks with a pronounced accent. Nothing whatever is made of this. This
mix is casual, but also crucial, because it serves to point up the play's
universality with the same understatement and lack of fuss that eliminating
sets and artifice did in that original 1938 production [of "Our Town"]. By
suggesting that the New England village be represented on stage by a non-
specific void, Wilder made his play universal. By transforming New England
into an idealized global village in microcosm, Wager is doing the same thing.
Bob Mondello, Rival Revivals, CITY PAPER, Nov. 30, 1990, at 30. See generally
Dan Sullivan, Colorblind Casting: It's Not Yet a Tradition: When Black is White,
Women Are Men, And the Theater Is Challenging, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1988, at
[Vol. 39:269
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guments are offered for entire cross-cultural productions, such as the
Cleveland Play House presentation of the "Glass Menagerie" with a black
cast.2
6
The debates over casting "Miss Saigon" and law school faculties reflect
the prevalence of contemporary assumptions about group differences.
They reflect arguments made on behalf of historically excluded groups
that group membership serves as a proxy for shared experiences and
especially common experiences as victims of societal prejudice. Oppo-
nents, styled as defenders of neutrality, resist such arguments because
they undermine the commitment to treating individuals as individuals.
2 7
Some opponents further charge that the call for hiring members of racial
minorities is incoherent if the advocates really want someone who holds
a particular, "politically correct" view. Skin color is no determinant of
such views, this argument continues, and political litmus tests for hiring
violate academic freedom.
The volley between these sides is interminable and confusing. Certainly
no one on one side convinces many on the other. Maybe we can understand
the debates better by seeing connections to deeper confusions about the
concept of representation throughout our society, made especially vivid
in legal and political contexts. Let's see how confused we can get, or how
confused we already are.
If treated as problems of representation, these issues must be examined
in light of the questions: who may speak for someone else? What is the
difference between symbolizing or standing for another, on the one hand,
and advancing the interests of another?28 Which should a representative
50, 52 ("If the first purpose of 'non-traditional' is to open up new jobs, the second
is to open up new possibilities.") Some critics have attacked such multiracial
casting as distracting and political while others suggest that non-traditional
casting suits classic or universal dramas but interferes with plays written about
a specific ethnic or cultural group. See Megen Rosenfeld, Theater: 1990 -The Year
Casting Turned a Color-Blind Eye to the Stage, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 30, 1990,
at G7; Joanne Kaufman, Acting's Not Just for Able-Bodied Whites, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Jan. 4, 1990, at A12, Cols. 1, 4 (discussing The Diary of Anne Frank
and Raisin in the Sun). Still others emphasize that non-traditional casting is not
intended to diminish opportunities for ethnic actors to play ethnic roles. See Lisa
Yoftee, Ethnic Casting Issues Get Soapbox Treatment, AMERICAN THEATER Feb.
1991, at 34.
26 See Josephine R. Abandy, A Message From the Artistic Director, in the CLEVE-
LAND PLAY HOUSE, THE GLASS MENAGERIE (Playbill, April 4-May 7, 1989) (an-
nouncing first professional all black production of "The Glass Menagerie" as a
response to the need to respect multiracial and multinational heritage). Abandy
concludes, "I also hope that this new interpretation of Tennessee Williams' haunt-
ing play will offer different and illuminating insights to those of you who are
familiar with it, and will open its wonders to new audiences who have never seen
it before." Id. Reviewer Tony Mastroianni acknowledged that this all-black pro-
duction reflected Abandy's effort to remedy past neglect of the Black community
by the Play House, but maintained that a better approach would be to produce
"good new plays by black playwrights." Tony Mastroianni, The Casting Cracks
This Glass Menagerie, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, April 15, 1989, at B5, Cols. 1-
3.
27 See Fried, supra note 11.
21 See HANNA FEINCHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
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pursue? I will suggest that enduring confusion about these issues of rep-
resentation pervades not only controversial hiring decisions but also a
range of contemporary legal issues.
One example is elected representatives. Should the representative do
just what the voters say they want, such as impose no new taxes, or
instead pursue what the representative understands to be the voters' real
and best interests? Should the representative look like the voters, eat
pork rinds or blintzes or enchiladas, or are these efforts to mirror or
resemble the represented irrelevant?29
Another example: who should serve on a jury and who should be dis-
qualified as biased or ill-equipped? Should all Spanish-speaking jurors
be excluded from a case involving Spanish-speaking witnesses out of fear
that these jurors will have special claims of expertise in the delibera-
tions-or would such exclusion deny the parties and the society a full
and fairly representative jury?30 Who may act as a named representative
in a class action: a typical member of the plaintiff group, a specially
articulate member, or a member whose injuries are exemplary in the
sense of displaying the full variety of those alleged by all the plaintiffs?31
When does the completion of a lawsuit preclude a new lawsuit on the
same issue brought by different people - when do the parties in the first
lawsuit adequately represent for subsequent possible parties? For ex-
ample, should a suit by black firefighters suing a city for discriminatory
hiring practices preclude a new suit by white firefighters dissatisfied with
the resulting affirmative action remedy?3 2 If the black firefighters cannot
represent white firefighters, can the city defending its practices represent
the whites? Or should the whites have a chance for a new day in court
because their interests were not represented by either the city or the
black plaintiffs?
29 The Supreme Court decided to apply the Federal Voting Rights Act to state
judicial elections, (see Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991); Houston Lawyers'
Association v. Texas Attorney General, 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). This decision
prompted the New York Times to ask, Are Judges Representatives? N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1991, at A13. This question recalls to mind Senator Roman Hruskas's
comment on one of President Nixon's nominees to the Supreme Court: "Even if
he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers.
They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they and a little chance?" 28
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 159 (1970).
30 See Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (Kennedy, J., plurality)(approving use of peremptory challenges to exclude all Spanish-speaking jurors).
But see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (rejecting exclusion from jury
of all those expressing religious or moral scruples about the death penalty because
such a jury would not fully represent the views of the community). Witherspoon
was limited, however, by Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). See generally Ste-
phen Gillers, Proving the Prejudice of Death-Qualified Juries After, Adams v.
Texas, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 219 (1985).
31 See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139, 143-150 (discussing decisions
denying black women as representatives of classes asserting sex discrimination).
32 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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When does a fiduciary fully represent the beneficiary and when should
doubts be raised about this representation? The fiduciary may have con-
cerns that differ from those of the beneficiary. This might be the case
with investment managers in charge of pension funds intended to benefit
some workers who have interests in the ongoing viability of the industry.
Those workers may prefer investments in that industry rather than in-
vestments with the highest market return.33 Does the fact that the fi-
duciary is not a member of the beneficiary group affect that investment
judgment? Would a member of the group make a better, more represen-
tative judgment? Or is this kind of concern for membership irrelevant to
investment decision-making, and properly so?
When should an attorney for tactical purposes have certain personal
characteristics because these might benefit the client? Should a woman
lawyer be willing to represent a man charged with rape, and a black
attorney represent a white employer charged with race discrimination?
When should an attorney's membership in the same group as the client
matter to the client, or to a judge? Would it make a difference if an
argument for gay rights is advanced by a lawyer who is "out"? Would it
make a difference if an argument on behalf of a person with a hearing
impairment is made by someone with a hearing impairment?34 Should
those group characteristics have an effect? Given that they do currently
have an effect, what tactical choices should attorneys and clients make,
and should any ethical concerns constrain those choices?
Finally, who can and who should speak for a child or a person physically
or mentally unable to speak for herself? What if a child faces a choice
between medical treatment or adherence to a religious belief? Who should
speak for an elderly person who cannot express a view about whether to
stay on a respirator?
11 See Martha Minow & Nell Minow, Franchise Republics: The Examples of
Shareholder Voting and Women's Suffrage, 41 FLA. L. REV. 639, 647 (1989).
31 When Michael Chatoff presented an oral argument to the Supreme Court in
a case involving the educational rights of a deaf child, he became the first deaf
attorney to appear in that Court. Barbara Rosewicz, Court Hears Argument by
Deaf Lawyer, UPI, March 23, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
Chatoff persuaded the Court to grant him permission to use an electronic com-
munications system that allowed him to read the questions spoken by the justices.
Charles Babcock, Deaf Attorney Argues Before High Court for Disabled Student,
WASHINGTON POST, March 24, 1982, at A2. Both this technological innovation
and the appearance of a deaf attorney elicited public attention to the case and
dramatized its issue which concerned the scope of accommodations required by
public schools obligated by Federal Law to educate students with disabilities. Id.
Ultimately denying the request for a sign language interpreter for the student,
the Supreme Court nonetheless ruled that federal law required some degree of
accommodation by the public schools. Board of Education of the Henrick Hudson
Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The Court concluded that
the federal statutory requirements would be satisfied if the state provided suf-
ficient personalized instruction and support services so that the individual child
would benefit educationally. Id.
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These are hard issues. With the help of some philosophic debates I will
suggest that we have long been confused about them. I will then argue
that two specific developments in legal and political thought cast new
confusion - but also new light - on the problem of representation. I
look first to the contributions of people concerned with difference, such
as feminists and critical race theorists, and then to the contributions of
a variety of scholars interested in empathy. After exploring the genuine
tension between these two emerging schools of thought, I will return to
a few of the legal questions I have just mentioned about who can and
who should represent another. And perhaps, I will also get a chance to
return to theater before I am done.
II. PRESENTING REPRESENTATION
To deal thoughtfully with confusion, I like to turn to philosophers,
especially analytic philosophers. It is not that I understand them. It is
that they are so clear about their confusion, so the rest of us can relax
about ours. Thus, if an analytic philosopher applies the clarifying tools
of careful study of words and their meanings, distinctions and their ap-
plications, and analogies and their limitations, and the subject still seems
confusing, the reader may conclude with some confidence that the concept
just is confusing. Such, I maintain, is with representation as a concept,
and I proffer the elegant book on the subject by Hanna Feinchel Pitkin
as evidence.3 5 Many contrasting meanings gather in the crevices of the
word, "representation." Two contrasting consequences result. Efforts to
pin down distinctive meanings may founder as the meanings shade into
and evoke one another. Efforts to clarify the concept may instead convert
ideal versions of representation into merely definitional notions. Pitkin's
ambitious historical and analytic treatment of the concept helps to depict
and describe these confusing dimensions of the notion, representation, as
she runs circles around the concept and also shows that the concept is
often circular as used.
Professor Pitkin identifies the relatively modern use of the concept,
and notes that the ancient Romans used a similar word to mean the
literal bringing into presence something previously absent, or the em-
bodiment of an abstraction in an object. 36 She then distinguishes two
dominant contemporary views of representation: the person who does
what is best for those in his charge and the person who reflects accurately
the wishes and opinions of those he is assigned to represent.3 7 But beyond
3 PITKIN, supra note 28.
36Id. at 3.
Id. at 4. A representative could fulfill both of these views if the client's wishes
match up with the representative's views of the client's best interests. This ob-
servation need not merely reflect the banal effect of coincidence because on oc-
casion, the representative may conclude that the client's best interests call for
expressing or deferring to the client's express views.
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this conceptual distinction, Professor Pitkin demonstrates the inadequacy
of any single definition for the concept.
38
Pitkin specifies and contrasts four divergent definitions and she si-
multaneously explores their mutual influences and internal tensions.
First, a formal definition looks to the authorized arrangement preceding
and initiating the creation of a representative. 9 Pitkin criticizes this
notion as circular; it lacks both any directive about the actual task to be
performed and any measure of accountability for the performance of that
task.40 In a second definition, representation refers to the notion of like-
ness, mirror, map or portrait. Representing here depends not on authority,
accountability, or any kind of acting, but instead on the representative's
characteristics and ability to "stand for" those he represents. 4' This def-
inition has a measure of the representative's success: it is the verisimi-
litude or believability of the representation. Because it turns on the
personal characteristics of the representative rather than any actions
taken, this concept resembles the emphasis on appearance in the debates
over hiring in "Miss Saigon" and law school faculties.
42
The emphasis on accuracy in this second definition is problematic. A
fully accurate depiction is probably impossible, even in art (where this
may not even be the goal).43 Because of this impossibility, other dimen-
sions of representation may operate under the name of appearance or
38 See, e.g., id., at 10, 53, 75, 87, 90, 115, 142.
1
9 Id. at 11, 27.
4.Id. at 28, 35, 39, 49. For this reason, Pitkin finds the concept incomplete if
not unworkable even by those, like Thomas Hobbes, who advocated the formalist
definition. Id., at 28, 35. Hobbes wishes to use the concept of representation to
resolve how people with separate and conflicting wills could live in peace. Id. at
35.
"' Id. at 61.
42 Yet the fact that a resemblance must be believed by others raises troubling
questions about the role of attitudes and concepts in constructing what people
think is real. A white actor may be "made up" to look Asian. A person who may
appear white may instead be African-American. See Ken Johnson, Being and
Politics, ART IN AMERICA, Sept. 1991 at 155. Johnson describes a video installation
by Adrian Piper entitled "Cornered." The work begins by confronting viewers
with a video of Piper who
does not appear to be black - she has neither the skin color nor the char-
acteristic facial features of someone of obvious African descent. And so she
begins by announcing, 'I'm black.' Then, in a coolly authoritarian tone she
suggests, 'Now let's deal with this social fact and the fact of my stating it
together.'
Id. at 155-56. This work of art includes philosophic arguments and suggests that
the questions it raises might help viewers to alter their understandings of
"reality." See id. at 156.
43 PITKIN, supra note 28, at 66-69, 87. And for depictions intended to be accurate
"representations" such as a map or blueprint, the thing itself must be read and
interpreted. Id. at 86. Some values and guides outside the representation itself
become critical in assessing its usefulness. See MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, Preface, in
the POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION: WRITING PRACTICES IN BIOGRAPHY, PHOTOGRA-
PHY, AND POLICY ANALYSIS XI (1988) ("representations do not imitate reality but
are the practices through which things take on meaning and value").
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imitation. Professor Pitkin notes: "As soon as the correspondence is less
than perfect, we must begin to question what sorts of features and char-
acteristics are relevant to action, and how good the correspondence is
with regard to just those features." 4 Choosing which traits to make rel-
evant raises questions of authorization or substitution. Alongside the
shortfall between ideal resemblance and limited resemblance is the gap
between the ideal and the real representative in other senses. The use of
one trait rather than others as a basis for resemblance further confuses
the relationship between ideal and real. "We tend to assume that people's
characteristics are a guide to the actions they will take, and we are
concerned with the characteristics of our legislators for just this reason.
But it is no simple correlation; the best descriptive representative is not
necessarily the best representative for activity or government.."45 As this
statement by Pitkin suggests, there is something slippery and thus mis-
leading in the use of a term like representation. One of its meanings
slides into its other meanings without consistency or reliability. Similarly,
talking about a representative in terms of a likeness may imply something
that is typical. Yet, this too may be unsatisfactory, for the concept does
not address along which lines the representative is to be typical. In asking
for a representative poem, we may not mean a typical one but instead
the best one, the best example. Similarly, people often choose represen-
tatives who are not typical of the class they represent.46
Besides the formal definition of authorized representation and the def-
inition of descriptive likeness, a third meaning of representation, as noted
by Pitkin, refers to symbolic substitution. The flag stands for the nation.
The symbol "x" stands for the unknown quantity of apples; "pi" stands
for plaintiff. This notion of a symbol, if freighted with meaning, may
explain why a leader who is not accountable or typical is nonetheless
sometimes described as a representative; that leader may in some respect
be a symbol of the polity, the community, or the beliefs of those repre-
sented.47 This definition, however, lacks any guide for what a represen-
tative is to do or how one could judge the performance of a representative. 48
Pitkin's fourth definition actually is a range of analogies to roles
through which an individual may provide, care, or speak for another.
Actor, trustee, deputy, agent, steward - these are all notions with dif-
44 PITKIN, supra note 28, at 88.
41 Id. at 89. Unfortunately, at this point Pitkin offers the example, from Grif-
fiths, of a lunatic who may be the best descriptive representative of lunatics, but
"one would not suggest that they be allowed to send some of their number to the
legislature." Id. Since members of the mental patient rights movement may sug-
gest something similar to this concept in urging representation of former mental
patients on governing bodies affecting mental patients, this passage seems at
best outdated.
41 Id. at 75-80, 90.
'
7 PITKIN, supra note 35, at 103-05.481Id. at 112-13.
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ferent shades of meaning pertinent to the idea of speaking for another.49
But the selection of which of these terms to accept as an analogy replicates
the central ambiguity within the notion of representation itself: should
the representative do what the represented party wants or what the
representative thinks is best?50 Professor Pitkin notes how tilting to either
extreme risks eliminating the very role of the representative. Doing en-
tirely what the represented party wishes converts the representative into
a mere conveyer of information, while doing only what the representative
thinks is best risks eliminating any connection, obligation, or account-
ability to the represented party.51 It is not enough, according to Pitkin,
for the representative to choose whether or not to pursue the client's
wishes. To be a representative, it is necessary also that such choices be
justifiable. 2 And yet this very notion of justification simply reopens the
question of what values or standards to use in measuring representation.
Talk of the interests, and even the objective interests of those repre-
sented is tempting when evaluating a representative, but the ambiguities
and assessment difficulties with this set of concepts are notorious. 53 In
Professor Pitkin's analysis, different theories of interests reflect contrast-
ing political conceptions of good, justice, knowledge, and social class and
social solidarity.54 She concludes that:
4 Id. at 125-43. Edmunde Burke's theory of representation, which Pitkin ex-
plores at length, emphasizes the judgment of the representative while pursuing
the constituents' interests:
it is our duty when we have the desires of the people before us, to pursue
them, not in the spirit of literal obedience, which may militate with their
very principle, much less to treat them with a peevish and contentious
litigation, as if we were adverse parties in a suit.... I cannot indeed take
upon me to say I have honour to follow the sense of the people. The truth
is, I met it on the way, while I was pursuing their interest according to my
own ideas.
EDMUNDE E. BURKE, WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE VOL. III at 354 (emphasis in
the original (London; Rivington, 1852).
so See, supra note 28, at 145, 153. Pitkin calls this the mandate-independence
controversy.
51 See id. at 153, 163-64.
All of these elements-what is to be represented, whether it is objectively
determinable, what the relative capacities of representative and constitu-
ents are, the nature of the issues to be decided, and so on-contribute to
defining a theorist's position on the continuum between 'taking care of' so
complete that it is no longer represented, and 'delivering their vote' so
passive that it is at most a descriptive 'standing for.' Id. at 214.
52 See PITKIN supra note 28, at 164. So when the representative feels in conflict
with the express orders of those represented, this fact calls for considering the
reasons for the discrepancy and may call for a reconsideration of the represen-
tative's views. Id. at 164-65.
See Pitkin, supra note 28, at 156-62.
r4 Compare PITKIN, supra note 28, at 173-74 (discussing Burke) with PITKIN,
at 195 (discussing Madison).
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[t]he more a writer sees interest[s], wants, and the like as
definable only by the person who feels or has them, the more
likely he is to require that a representative consult his con-
stituents and act in response to what they ask of him. At the
extreme, again, substantive acting for others becomes impos-
sible, and a theorist must either fall back on other views of
representation or declare the concept an illusion.5 5
Ultimately, the representative quality of given persons or institutions
turns on their capacities to justify themselves to those who are allegedly
represented or who otherwise care.56 Again circularity of the concept
appears; "representative" means what others are convinced it means. So
if you and I are confused about how to measure or check whether someone
is a good representative or whether a representative function is appro-
priate to a given role, we are in good company. Pitkin's work at least
affords vocabulary for naming the possible meanings that are afloat amid
the confusion.
B. The Historical Moment For The Question
Not just confusion but also conflict over the meaning of representation
emerges now in the face of two recent movements in scholarly circles.
The first I will call difference theory; it has been pursued especially by
feminists and critical race theorists. They have questioned the use of
abstract universal terms or norms by showing how implicitly those terms
or norms actually embrace the particular experiences or interests of those
in positions of sufficient authority or dominance to govern. However much
universal and abstract norms may once have advanced a democratic and
anti-hierarchical agenda, 57 in current operation such ideas often fail to
reflect - fail to represent - the experiences, interests, and needs of the
full variety of human beings. Thus, traditional norms of equality and
liberty may have well-suited white Christian men without disabilities
but often disadvantaged any who depart from that particular identity
and experience. Freedom from the establishment of a religion, according
to the Supreme Court, is not violated by public displays of a Christmas
creche when combined with secular symbols.58 For non-Christians, this
55 Id. at 210.
56 See id. at 240. Perhaps Pitkin herself became confused here, or tempted to
blend the related but distinct questions of what it means to be a representative
and what it means to be a good representative.
51 See STEPHEN HOLMES, The Secret History of Self Interest, in BEYOND SELF
INTEREST 267, 284 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
58 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). In subsequent decisions, theCourt further confused matters by rejecting as a violation of the Establishment
Clause a display that lacked any secular figures, while approving a display that
combined a Christmas tree with a Chanukah menorah. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989).
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"neutral" rule does not feel neutral. (Indeed, observant Christians, too,
may be insulted by treatment of a significant religious holiday that ren-
ders both Santa and Jesus as simply shopping mall decorations.) 59
Similarly, equal protection against discrimination on the basis of sex
is not violated, again according to the Supreme Court, where an employer
refuses to include pregnancy in its insurance coverage, because not only
men but also some women are not pregnant at any given time.60 Again,
from the perspective of many women, this decision seems a bit peculiar
and reflective of something other than women's experiences. A rule about
what constitutes rape that requires a victim to fight back physically but
does not take her verbal "no" as sufficient resistance reflects traditionally
male rather than traditionally female understandings of sexuality and
of self-defense. 61 Let me try one more: a rule guaranteeing freedom to
enter into binding contracts may look neutral.6 2 But if it lacks any pro-
hibition against racially discriminatory treatment within those contracts,
anyone in jeopardy of discrimination on the basis of race would view this
as a perversely crabbed interpretation of freedom of contract. Nonethe-
less, this is the Supreme Court's present view.
Theorists of difference have taken such examples and explored how
apparently neutral, abstract rules written without the perspective of some
end up implementing the perspectives of others.6 3 Advocates for persons
with disabilities have been especially effective in this critique recently.
They have demonstrated how historic efforts restraining the use of sign
language so that profoundly deaf people could fit into the larger society
actually denied those people meaningful language. 64 They have pointed
out how buildings that are inaccessible to people who use wheelchairs
are not neutral but disabling, and how mass transit systems that are
hazardous to people with visual or hearing impairments are also not
neutral but instead reflect the kinds of persons for whom they were clearly
designed.65
If we think about people excluded by such social institutions and rules,
two cautionary rules emerge. First, claims to know what others want or
59 See David Cobin, Creches, Christmas Trees and Menorahs: Weeds Growing
in Roger Williams' Garden, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1597, 1609-10.
60 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
61 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29-56 (1987).
62 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
- See CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 1-5 (1987); MARTHA Mi-
NOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW
(1990); Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987). Cf PIERRE CLASTRES,
SOCIETY AGAINST THE STATE (1989) (criticizing anthropological accounts that treat
as universal the particular cultural patterns of the anthropologist's own society).
See OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES 25-26 (1989).
65 See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis
of a Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 418-
19, 460-63, 470-81 (1991).
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need are suspect if made without the basis of shared experiences along
the lines of the trait used for past exclusions. Translation: You don't know,
and you get it wrong. This is what the excluded group is likely to say to
those outside their group who claim to speak for them. Secondly, claims
to speak for others by people not in the group are vulnerable on the
grounds that participation itself is a value and the process of representing
a viewpoint is an exercise of power that should be enjoyed by those on
whose behalf the exercise is claimed. Perhaps no representative can be
fully able to know the interests of everyone in the group. But as a political
matter, the group may want to give the benefit of the doubt to a member
of the group. It is a matter of trust. Translation: We speak for ourselves
and thus one of us should do the speaking. Speaking expresses power; it
is empowering; and speaking for others depends upon their trust.
The difference critique is associated with what can be called "identity
politics. ' 66 Some of its exponents call for proportional representation in
the electoral context. Some of its opponents, and even some who sym-
pathize, raise pointed objections. How many differences now need to be
represented? Must the African-American caucus divide along gender lines
and the gender caucus divide along racial lines, and all of them divide
further along the lines of sexual orientation, disability, and religion? If
so, how can any political movement emerge?6 7 Others challenge the im-
plicit claim that sociological traits of a person match interests or pref-
erences and still others worry about the conflicts between notions of
identity as natural or fixed and notions of identity as personally chosen
or socially constructed. 68
But this is simply a glimpse of the debates internal to this movement.
The difference critique endures and affords an angle on problems of rep-
resentation. Indeed, the rules and practices about given forms of repre-
sentation may be vulnerable to the criticism that they veil, in the guise
of a false universalism, the particular views and interests of some. For
those rules and practices, justifiable representation may call for attention
to the two claims: (1) you don't know, and you get us wrong; and (2) we
speak for ourselves. 69
- See generally IRIs YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 156-91
(1990).
67 See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988) for an elegant exploration of these differences and
a call for politics based on mutual consultation and struggle.
61 See Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Con-
structionism, 17 SOCIALIST REVIEW 10 (May-August 1987) (identifying conflict
between academic arguments that gay identity is fluid and socially constructed
and political argument that gay identity is natural and determined).
69 There could be additional claims: (3) You do know, and you do us wrong
(deliberate racism, etc.); (4) it's our turn to do for ourselves (nationalism response);
(5) only with a representative from our group can we each have the vicarious
experience of speaking and being there. Thanks to Anita Allen and Moshe Hal-
bertal for these points.
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C. The Challenge Of Empathy
A second and contrasting challenge to notions of representation ques-
tions the assumption that people cannot justifiably speak for others be-
cause they have sharply distinct and conflicting interests. That we each
have distinct and conflicting interests is a familiar, liberal idea. The idea
that we are each self-interested monads abounds, although it has not
been powerful enough to preclude many models and forms of represen-
tation in law and politics. At least since Hobbes, the problem that rep-
resentation was supposed to solve rested on a view that humans are
separate and have conflicting wills. 7 0 Moreover, where theories of liber-
alism, democracy, and relativism dominate, as they have in recent Amer-
ican culture, people "tend to think that, in the last analysis, each man
has the right to define his own good, and if he rejects something, no one
has the right to insist that it is good for him."7' Representation, on this
view, is appropriate only for people who know their own interests and
who can find an agent with no clashing interests.72
But maybe, just maybe, the idea that we are all basically self-interested
is wrong. This is the kind of doubt posed by the second new development
in scholarship that challenges rules of representation. Some feminists,
some humanists, and some self-styled communitarians join a variety of
people who think it wrong or incomplete to think of people as simply
separate, autonomous, and self-interested. I will call these people the
70 See PITKIN, supra note 28, at 35 (discussing Hobbes). Note: Hobbes expressly
excluded wives and "property" which encompassed slaves.
"' PITKIN, supra note 28, at 159. Pitkin notes further that children and others
who are thought not to be able to know their own interests cannot be represented;
instead, others take care of them. "Representation enters the picture precisely
where the person acted for is conceived as capable of acting and judging for
himself; and of such a person we assume that he will want what is in his interest."
Id. at 162. This does, however, lead to paradoxical ideas about who exactly is
competent to know his own interests; for if someone wants something that others
think is not in his interest, the others may conclude he is not competent to know
his interests and thus to select a representative to advance them. See Martha
Minow, Why Ask Who Speaks for the Child: Review of Gaylin & Macklin, Who
Speaks for the Child; The Problems of Proxy Consent, 53 HARV. ED. REv. 444
(1983).
72 For a thoughtful article challenging this view in the context of legal rep-
resentation for children see Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer
for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 NEB. L. REv. 330 (1989).
The authors describe three complex cases in which they represented young chil-
dren in custody and visitation cases following their parents' divorces, and develop
a set of presumptions for guiding lawyers in such situations to assure children's
protection in and from the litigation process itself. They further call for inves-
tigation by the lawyer into the child's actual interests and advocacy of those
interests. In a sense, such lawyers not only represent but also enact or embody
the interests of children; the lawyer for a child assures distinct attention to the
person who might otherwise be neglected or used by adults.
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empathy advocates. They argue that people (1) often want to care about
the good of others (altruism) and (2) have the ability to understand and
know the wants and needs of others (empathy).73 The empathy advocates
also argue that individuals act out of duty, love, and malevolence as well
as self-interest, and that "people often take account of both other indi-
viduals' interests and the common good when they decide what constitutes
a 'benefit' that they want to maximize. 7 4 Works by Amartya Sen in
economics, J.G.A. Pocock in history, and Carol Gilligan in psychology
indicate the variety of disciplines and specific points made by scholars
advocating this view.
7 5
These critics identify the power of altruism, the motivation and will-
ingness to care for and give to others with no hope of gain for oneself.76
They point out the power of group identity, or solidarity, that enhances
cooperation without any expectation of future reciprocity or current re-
wards or punishments. 77 They also explain the malleability of human
beings, and discuss how learning environments and social arrangements
can reinforce either selfishness or sharing and altruism.78 They have
confidence in at least some cognitive and emotional capacities we each
have to resonate and identify others. Translation: (1) Don't be so sure I
don't care to understand you or cannot understand you, and (2) give me
a chance or else you're the one who ensures that we'll just all be selfish.
If these critics are onto something, they too provide a set of questions
to test existing rules and practices about representation. If people already
can take the perspective of others and care for them, then maybe people
who are not like me can nonetheless represent me. And if people learn
71 See LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY (1980).
14 JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND SELF INTEREST at ix, x (1990). Mansbridge
suggests that this approach involves in part a return to pre-modern understand-
ings while also preserving the insights of modern social science.
71 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); and Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, in SCIENTIFIC MODELS
AND MEN 317-44 (H. Harris ed., 1978).76 E.g., ALFIE KOHN, THE BRIGHTER SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE: ALTRUISM AND
EMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1990); Virginia Held, Mothering vs. Contract, in
BEYOND SELF INTEREST 287, 294 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed. 1990).
77 Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or my
Conscience, in BEYOND SELF INTEREST 97, 99 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
71 KOHN, supra note 76, at 118-204 (discussing social science research indicat-
ing that predispositions to share and to be selfish can be reinforced or snuffed
out); Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation
of Political Life, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 3, 20-21 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990)
(describing James Buchanan who won the Nobel Prize in economics for applying
to economics a rational choice model based on self-interest and then "repudiated
the single motive of self-interest in favor of looking at context" and interdepend-
ence between people and rules and institutions, concluding that "we should try
to design institutions to encourage motivations we believe on normative grounds
are either good in themselves or will lead to good and just outcomes").
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and grow more or less empathetic toward others depending upon the
worlds and others they encounter, then maybe we should bet on rules
predicated on empathy instead of rules presumed on narrow self-inter-
est.7
9
Have you noticed that these questions point in quite different directions
for the inquiry prompted by the difference critics? ° The difference critics
call for skepticism about the possibility of representation by people who
are not themselves members of the represented group. They remind us
that representatives often get it wrong. They remind us that participation
itself is a value and should be enjoyed by members of the actual groups
that have not been allowed to speak for themselves in the past. The
empathy advocates in contrast urge greater confidence in people's capac-
ity to care for others and also recommend reconstructing rules and in-
stitutions to expect and reinforce that capacity. They remind us of the
possibility that people can be other-regarding, and the possibility that
societal rules affect this very possibility. How about that for confusion!
But maybe this is good confusion. Keeping in mind contrasting commit-
ments may make things seem complicated but also genuine and honest.s
Keeping in mind the philosopher's confusions about representation, I
now add the two contrasting set of inquiries as I turn to examine examples
of current rules and practices about representation. Besides pursuing the
questions prompted by each set of criticisms, I will also try to evaluate
the probative power of each critique in light of which problem has been
more severe in each context: a failure to acknowledge differences or a
failure to consider human capacity for empathy.
III. SCRUTINIZING RULES OF REPRESENTATION
I will not have time to examine each of the legal contexts of represen-
tation I mentioned at the start. But here are two, and a mention of the
others in hopes of prompting further discussion.
7 Contemporary African-American theater often analogously challenges the
assumption of a separation between audience and stage and seeks to use theater
to create or reinvent cultural unity and militant nationalism. See GENEVIEVE
FABRE, DRUMBEATS, MASKS, AND METAPHOR: CONTEMPORARY AFRO-AMERICAN
THEATER 104-05, 108, 218, 236-38 (1983).
80 These questions point in quite different directions in evaluating a theory of
representation like Edmunde Burke's. The difference critique might well raise
suspicions about his claims that a representative's own judgment may be better
in pursuing constituents' interests than their express views, while the empathy
critique might provide renewed support for Burke. Yet the notion of empathy
seems to refer to a more egalitarian relation between representative and con-
stituent than Burke's elite enlightened trustee who may sympathize with others
from a superior position. See EDMUNDE BURKE, III WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE
354 (1852).
81 The contrasting commitments here arise along at least two dimensions. Thus,
understanding human self-interest and altruism reflects one contrast; recognizing
each individual as the important unit of analysis contrasts with a view of the
group as the important unit of concern.
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A. Juries And Group Representation
The Supreme Court recently considered "whether a prosecutor's prof-
fered explanation that prospective Latino jurors were struck from the
venire because he suspected they might not abide by official translations
of Spanish language testimony constitutes an acceptable 'race neutral'
explanation"? 2 The lower court acknowledged in this case that the de-
fendant had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination.8 3 The
question posed was whether the government provided an adequate ex-
planation for using its peremptory challenges. The case presented two
related problems. First, is the use of peremptory challenges that results
in a jury with apparently no Hispanic members a violation of an equal
protection? And, secondly, if these challenges do produce a jury lacking
members of Spanish heritage is that result a constitutional violation?
4
Earlier cases questioned the apparent exclusion of racial and ethnic
minorities and women8 5 from juries and jury pools. Even when the legal
doctrine at stake is equal protection,8 the notion of representation is close
at hand. The popular conception of the jury as a group of peers is rooted
in the institution's origins.8 7 In addition, for some period of time, English
law demanded that a suit involving a foreigner be tried by a jury composed
at least in part by foreigners.8 Social class, country of origin, race, eth-
nicity, and gender thus each have had significance in assuring the rep-
resentative fairness of a jury.
At stake in the composition of juries is a conception of that decision-
making body as a representative cross-section of the society.8 9 Achieving
52 Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990) (granting cert. limited to this
question and a question about the proper standard of review). The Court rejected
the challenge. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
People v. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y.App.2d 1988)(citing Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
One prior related case is United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.
1990) (remanding for new trial in similar case because none of the information
regarding exclusion or acceptance of jurors was available to the parties or the
court). In Alcantar, the prosecutor objected to Spanish-speaking jurors because
some of the evidence introduced would be tape recordings of the defendant dis-
cussing her crimes. Id. at 437. The prosecutor feared that Spanish-speaking jurors
would interpret the tapes different from the official translation and, claiming a
special expertise, influence the other jurors. Id.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S 522 (1975); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
1 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S
475 (1954). Other similar cases interpret the Sixth Amendment. Taylor v. Lou-
isiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
17 CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM 116-71 (1980).
-See Marianne Constable, The Jury 'De Medietate Linguae': Changing Con-
ceptions of Citizenship, Law, and Knowledge (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of California (Berkeley)).
9 Tracy L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory
Challenge Abuse, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 781, 787-93 (1986).
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at least symbolic community participation in justice, this cross-section
appearance provides the "likeness" version of representation, the resem-
blance to the larger community.90 It also helps promote the apparent
legitimacy of the result. As one commentator put it, "the jury is not a
scientific instrument but rather a body that, through its diversity, can
be fair."91
Besides the appearance of fairness through representation, the cross-
sectional jury also promises to give insights based on the range of par-
ticular experiences that different kinds of people have. The film, "Twelve
Angry Men" for example, suggests how a juror with the same kind of
background as the defendant could bring knowledge about how street
kids use switchblades.92 Differences of gender, race, and ethnicity provide
for different kinds of knowledge relevant to the tasks of a jury. In this
conception, the dimension of representation that matters is not the formal
authorization idea, nor the trusteeship, but the descriptive or portrait
representation. 93 Although interests of the represented group may be
germane as well, it is as much the interests of the whole, diverse com-
munity in being mirrored aptly that is here at work. Moreover, the de-
liberative process within a group of diverse members brings the
community within the institution of justice.
By this theory, the prosecutor improperly used peremptories to strike
all Hispanic and Spanish-speaking jurors in People v. Hernandez.9 4 Strik-
ing otherwise eligible jurors because of their special knowledge under-
mines the purposes of bringing that special knowledge into the process
and also removes otherwise eligible jurors because of their ethnic iden-
tity.95
O Id.
91 Id. at 790-91.
92 Id. at 791 n.50. In a different way, "Silence of the Lambs," a movie depicting
a serial killer with insight into how another serial killer will behave, suggests
how people may understand others like themselves. However, I am unsure that
this calls for representation of serial killers on juries. Insight does not mean
judgment.
91 See supra n.41 (discussing Pitkin). Thus the descriptive dimension is
achieved as traits like race and ethnicity become proxies for the variety of persons
and knowledge in the society.
582 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App.2d 1988). The basic doctrine in the field holds
that the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury does not guarantee "jury
of any particular composition," but instead that the jury be drawn from "a source
fairly representative of the community." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538
(1975). But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (which added to the mix
the requirement that the use of peremptory challenges not reflect racially or
ethnically discriminatory purposes).
91 This was not the Supreme Court's conclusion. A plurality of the Court con-
cluded that the prosecutor offered a sufficiently race-neutral explanation by not-
ing that the Spanish-speaking jurors might have difficulty accepting the English
translator's version of Spanish testimony. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct.
1859 (1991) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). None of the opinions in the case
explored the complex and partial relationships between ethnicity and fluency in
Spanish.
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Yet the critics of difference and empathy would shed contrasting lights
on this problem. Suspicion of abstract rules for favoring some groups over
others supports a challenge to the prosecutor's allegedly neutral reasons
for striking the Spanish-speaking jurors. Fears that those jurors would
not limit themselves to the official translation or would attain special
influence in the jury room sound neutral but have the effect of preferring
Anglos and disfavoring Hispanics.9 6 Any jury selection process, however
neutrally defined, that produces juries excluding people who look like the
defendant, exposes the process to the following questions: how can these
people judge someone unlike themselves, and isn't it time for members
of the group to participate? 97 These questions cast some doubt on the very
premise of the peremptory challenge. In contemporary practice, the abil-
ity of the prosecution and of the defense to excuse a number of jurors
without stating a cause responds to a perceived need to screen out biased
jurors. 98 One kind of presumed bias is that the juror has experiences like
those of the defendant; the fear here is that the juror will be unable to
judge objectively if he or she resembles the defendant. Critics respond:
why is someone so different likely to be objective? Perhaps the very
grounds of difference give rise to bias. If you exclude all women from a
jury called to judge a woman charged with killing her husband, why
assume that men on the jury are objective?" Moreover, even without bias,
someone quite different from the defendant may simply fail to understand
her experiences. Especially if the juror belongs to a group that in general
dominates the political and social worlds, that jury may lack awareness
of the perceptions and motivations of someone outside that group, and
may even lack tools to understand someone so different.
The empathy inquiry may seem to cut in the opposite direction, but it,
too, gives grounds for questioning any peremptory challenges. It suggests
that people can and do act out of motives beyond their own self-interest,
and that people have capacities to empathize with others. It is not clear
how wide that capacity is, and whether it can reach across the kinds of
- Another effect is to elevate the English translation - or representation -
of the evidence over the Spanish version. The actual effects on the outcome if
Hispanics jurors participate in a criminal trial involving an Hispanic defendant
are hardly obvious. Members of the same group may be tougher than others in
judging criminal matters. Yet they may also better understand excusing circum-
stances or more critically evaluate the law enforcement practices. In addition,
diversity within the group called Hispanics renders predictions about their voting
patterns on a jury dubious.
91 These are the difference claims: how can you know, and we should speak for
ourselves.
91 Altman, supra note 89, at 795. Cf. Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 115, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("Black lawyers
have litigated in the federal courts almost exclusively before white judges, yet
they have not urged that white judges should be disqualified on matters of race
relations.").
See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). Historian Linda Kerber is exploring
the historical context for the arguments in that case.
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differences that have come to matter in this society: race, ethnicity, gen-
der, class. But why permit a rule about peremptory challenges that would
presume that people cannot empathize across lines of difference? Not only
could such a rule be untrue to human possibilities; it might also be a self-
fulfilling prophesy. 00
It remains fair to ask whether empathies run differently between people
who share those traits compared with people who do not.101 My tentative
answer is: I don't know. That very answer supports an argument for
preserving the fullest cross-section possible and limiting or ending per-
emptory challenges. Only then can the full range of empathic and non-
empathic possibilities be played out. If the jury is to be representative,
it should represent this kind of social variety.
B. Class Action Representation
The civil procedure rule that allows a group to serve as a party presents
the courts with the difficulty of representation: who can speak for the
group and who can lead them or exemplify them before the court? The
federal rule, and the rules of states that copy it, specifically require that
the parties selected as representatives be typical of the group 10 2 and be
able to demonstrate their ability adequately to represent the group. 10 3
This element often applies as much to the parties' ability to secure at-
torneys who can provide adequate representation for the class as it does
to the named parties' own representative capacity. 0 4 Where the repre-
sentation is adequate and the court certifies the class, a final judgment
100 See Altman, supra note 89, at 800 (discussing possibility that people are
more or less empathetic in relation to rules and institutional expectations).
101 Sharing a trait does not entail understanding one another even in light of
that trait, much less in relation to other traits that are not shared.
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
103 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(4).
104 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 1985);
Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 942 (1980). A special problem arises where an attorney who is a member of
the class seeks to be its named representative as well as its counsel. See Kelly
A. Freeman, Note, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Representation Vis-a-Vis
Class Representative and Class Counsel, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 141 (1986). Cf. Ox-
endine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975)(non-lawyer prisoner denied
right to represent others in pro se class action, largely for questions of compe-
tence). See generally Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (ex-
ploring potential conflicts in goals between public interest lawyers and their
clients).
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binds all its members, for they are deemed to have had a fair opportunity
to be heard. 10 5
The rule's demand that the class representative be typical seems to
adopt one of Professor Pitkin's types of representing: the descriptive
standing for another, the mirror providing a likeness or portrait of the
others.'0 6 Yet with adequacy of representation, the rule seems to have
opted for a definition more concerned with the kinds of action the rep-
resentatives can and will take; what matters is not simply their char-
acteristics but also their behavior as representatives - and their lawyers'
ability and accountability in that regard. 0 7 The rule seems attuned to
the difference critique; with adequacy of representation it seems to con-
sider the empathy view that one may speak for others as members of agroup with shared interests in the absence of conflicting interests.08
Yet perhaps most importantly, both terms show how the class action
rule opts for some notion of representation. It is not enough for the rep-
resentative simply to be able to enforce legal rights for others.'00 It is not
enough merely to protect or advocate a legal interest. The representative
also must be free from conflicting interests. And the representative in
some way must stand for, symbolize, or depict the members of the class.
As Professor Bryant Garth has noted, "A court presented only with ar-guments, not with the representatives of real constituencies, might ignore
the interests and views of what might be a majority of a lawsuit's ben-
eficiaries. ' ' 0 Part of the advocacy, part of the right to be heard seems toinclude the presentation and representation of actual people who in some
important way look like those they represent. That resemblance may serve
as a proxy or predictor for who is likely to share interests or have access
to knowledge about the interests of the others. But that resemblance may
,o See Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183,1192 (1982). This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the special rep-
resentation problems presented where a class includes potentially conflictinginterests and of procedural mechanisms for dealing with the problem of discerningthe views of a large class. For a proposal for an exception to the attorney-clientprivilege to help absent class members enforce the representational obligations
of named parties, see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Class Actions: Fash-ioning an Exception to Promote Adequacy of Representation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 947(1984).
106 See supra note 47 (discussing Pitkin's theory of standing for as a descriptive
representative).
107 See supra note 51-2 (accountability and action as dimensions of represen-
tation).
"I' Especially for defendant classes, some have proposed that those shared in-terests should predate the litigation itself. See Scott P. Miller, Note, Certification
of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM_ L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1984).
'0 Bryant Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspec-
tive, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 492, 503 (1982). Even an argument for eliminating class
representatives concludes by recommending a continued role for "exemplary class
members." See Jean W. Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Rep-resentatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 194-95 (1990).
"(I Garth, supra note 109, at 520.
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be important separately for the symbolic effect in the represented com-
munity and in the fora where they perform their representative tasks.
I think that this dimension helps to explain some court decisions such
as Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc."' There a black man who
had been discharged from employment sought to represent a class of "all
similarly situated Negroes seeking equal employment opportunities" in
a case claiming that the employer discriminated on the basis of race not
only in discharges, but also in hiring, promotion, and the operation of
segregated facilities. The trial court rejected this broadly defined class
and restricted the class to those persons discharged because of their race.
The appeals court reversed and allowed the broad class, reasoning that
the allegations of racial discrimination throughout the employer's prac-
tices was sufficiently common to, and typical of, the claims of the broader
class. It acknowledged that the named representative might not be ad-
equate to speak for class members whose injury arose not from discharge
but from other employment practices, but the reviewing court did not
conclude that this factual and legal difference would render the dis-
charged party an inadequate representative. The common trait of mem-
bership in the minority racial group apparently stood out in the court's
mind as the salient factor justifying both the broad definition of the class
and the possible representation by the discharged party. The trait of racial
minority membership, I suggest, would allow that individual to stand for
all others claiming discrimination, albeit a variety of discriminations, on
the basis of race. 112 The Supreme Court has subsequently rejected this
kind of "across-the-board" class,' 3 and I wonder whether this reflects a
failure to understand symbolic and depiction aspects of representation.
How would the "across-the-board" class, represented by someone who
shared only the trait of minority race membership, survive the difference
critique and the empathy inquiry? Many difference theorists are currently
engaged in questioning whether shared racial membership alone repre-
sents a real and significant similarity, or whether talk of the perspective
of blacks, or even the perspective of black women, obscures the "rich
diversity" existing among people who can be identified that way. 114 Pro-
fessor Patricia Hill Collins has defended the notion of a black feminist
standpoint to encompass "the plurality of experiences" that nonetheless
also include "a distinctive set of experiences that offers a different view
of material reality than that available to other groups." 115 The fact of
417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
"' But see General Telephone v. Falcon, 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated
in part and remanded, 457 U.S. 147 (1982)(rejecting class certified to represent
both employees denied promotion and applicants denied employment). See also
Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986) (approving
the splitting into two classes of employees and applicants).
113 See George M. Strickler, Jr., Protecting the Class: The Search for the Ade-
quate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 73 (1984).
114 Patricia Hill Collins, The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought,
14 SIGNS 745, 747 n.8 (1989).
" Id. at 747 & n.8.
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subordination is critical to her identification of a black feminist stand-
point. She acknowledges social class variations that help explain why not
all African-American women share the standpoint she articulates.116
Nonetheless, membership in a racial minority stands as a symbol of his-
toric subordination which, for some purposes, should count as a basis for
adequate representation. 1 7 I think the same could be argued for sex,
although the courts have often viewed racial differences among women
as salient enough to deny class representative status to a black women
for a class of white and black women. 118
What about the empathy inquiry? 19 The Supreme Court itself has
permitted the certification of a class whose representative no longer has
a live, viable claim to match the claims of the represented class. 120 In
these cases, the Court emphasized not only that the class representative
116 Id.
"I Similarly, one court approved a woman as a representative in a sex dis-
crimination class although the named representative also held a position as an
officer in the defendant corporation, apparently on the grounds that the position
was only honorary. Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590 (2d. Cir. 1986).
Perhaps the court approves the woman as a representative because sex is thicker
than job titles.
118 May black women serve as class representatives in law suits asserting both
race and sex discrimination? See Kimberl Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the In-
tersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doc-
trine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 143-
44. In applying the class action rule to refuse this class representative status to
black women, several courts remain vulnerable to the difference critique.
110 Interestingly, Professor Collins also identified the ethic of caring for others,
including the capacity for empathy, as elements of an alternative, African-Amer-
ican feminist epistemology. Collins, supra note 114, at 765-68. This suggests that
although tensions between difference critiques and empathy critiques exist, so
do important points of specific connection. The development of a black feminist
epistemology partly reflects a difference critique attacking feminism for assuming
that all women share something as women. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, supra
note 67. Collins notes how the commitment to caring is a point of convergence
between white and black feminists. Collins, supra note 114, at 768. Yet, this point
begins to raise questions about what exactly is the meaning of claims that "caring"
is specific to the African-American feminist viewpoint.
120 See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980)(named
plaintiff allowed to appeal the denial of class certification even after his own claim
had become moot); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)(permitting class to proceed
although the named plaintiff had already satisfied the residency requirement and
obtained a divorce and so no longer had a live claim against the state one-year
residency requirement for a divorce); McCoy v. Ithaca Housing Authority, 559
F.Supp. 1351 (N.D. N.Y. 1983)(class action can proceed even though part of named
plaintiffs claim became moot). See generally C. Douglas Floyd, Civil Rights Class
Actions in the 1980's: The Burger Court's Pragmatic Approach to Problems of
Adequate Representation and Justiciability, 1984 B.Y. U. L. REV. 1, 31-44. Dif-
ferent concerns arise where the named plaintiff seeks damages while the class
seeks equitable relief, for a conflict of interest appears when the defendant offers
to the named plaintiff a cash settlement or a settlement precluding further action
by the class. See Williams v. Vukovoch, 720 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983); Franks v.
Kroger, 649 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1981); Robert P. Schuwerk, Future Class Actions,
39 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 198 (1987).
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had no conflicting interest with the class,1 2' but also that the represen-
tative could actually competently urge the interests of the class, even
while lacking an actually identical claim. 122 In one case, the Court went
further and characterized the named representative as a "private attorney
general.' 23 If the reference to "attorney general" means anything in this
context, it includes the respect for someone entrusted with pursuing the
legal rights of others even without needing to have an actual personal
claim.' 24 It also means the possibility of empathy, proper incentives and
resources.
125
Yet, in each of these instances, the named representative had at one
time been a member of the class or experienced the kind of injury alleged
by the class as a whole. That historical experience may be irrecoverable,
but still the individual can remain a class representative. Thus, one court
approved as a class representative for a law suit challenging the em-
ployer's maternity policy a woman who had been sterilized.' 26 She had
once been able to become a mother, and that was enough to allow her to
serve as a representative of mothers. The possibility of empathy without
a common historical experience is not regarded by the courts as adequate
for representation. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit recently approved the dis-
trict court's denial of class certification where the named plaintiff for the
proposed class of Haitian citizens facing United States deportation or
exclusion proceedings or seeking political asylum in the United States
did not allege that he himself was a member of that class. 27 Instead,
noted the appellate court, "He is an attorney who represents Haitians
facing action by the INS.' 28
121 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 403.
122 Id.
122 United States v. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403.
124 See Strickler, supra note 113, at 144-45.
1"5 Id. This notion is also compatible with the view of litigation as a form of
expression and political action. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) and
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), in which groups and organizations may become
involved in litigation that actually focuses on a smaller number of actual litigants.
Derrick Bell has criticized this particular dimension of school desegregation lit-
igation. Bell, supra note 104. This criticism has prompted sustained debate since
its publication.
126 Association of Flight Attendants v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 89 F.R.D. 52, 62
(S.D. Tex. 1981). The court did not consider whether this individual retained a
live interest in the maternity policy should she adopt, nor whether the policy
covered adoption.
127 Ray v. United States Dept. of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice and State Department, 908 F.2d 1549, 1558 (1lth Cir. 1990). The court did not
therefore pursue an argument empathy advocates would advance: that empathy
can arise even in the absence of an identical experience and they would defend
as a representative someone who both wants to care and demonstrates under-
standing of those needing representation.
12 Id. at 1558.
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Thus, the difference and empathy critics converge in supporting the
approval of class representatives who share social and historical char-
acteristics of past experience with the class, even if the representative
no longer has the same experience or same legal claim. This underscores
the significance of the depiction and symbolic dimensions of represen-
tation, alongside evidence that the representative can, in fact, adequately
advance the views and claims of the constituent group. 129 A representative
is sufficiently like the class if the representative actually once had ex-
periences similar to those of the other class members.
C. Other Rules Of Representation
With more time and space, I would now turn to more representation
issues. Consider preclusion rules: when is someone adequately repre-
sented in one law suit and therefore subsequently barred from bringing
a new lawsuit?3 °
When is someone an adequate fiduciary for a beneficiary? Is it helpful
or harmful to share interests or social experiences with the beneficiary
in making, for example, investment decisions for a pension fund?
131
How should we judge the representation of clients by professional such
as lawyers and doctors? How should we judge the tactics pursued by the
client who wants a lawyer from his or her own "group"?13 2 Is this a wise
tactic or one that undermines professional representation? How about
when the client seeks someone from a different group, such as when a
man charged with rape seeks a woman defense attorney, or when a white
employer charged with racial discrimination seeks a black or hispanic
attorney? Are these legitimate and wise tactics or, instead, efforts to take
advantage of stereotypes and prejudice?
What about employment itself? Is being hearing-impaired an important
qualification for serving as the president of Galladette University, and if
so, why?133 Does sharing a trait with one's students enable service as a
role model, an expert, or as a representative, and if so, in what sense?
129 Taking this point one step further, a distinguished civil rights lawyer has
noted that the disparity in socioeconomic circumstance "between the average civil
rights attorney and the average client or class member in a civil rights case" can
"create problems in the relationship." Julius Chambers, Class Action Litigation:
Representing Divergent Interests of Class Members, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 353, 355
(1979). Chambers does not suggest that these problems rise to the level of chal-
lenging the adequacy of representation (which covers the lawyer as well as the
named representative) but instead urges greater attention to this problem of
distance by the legal profession in general. Id.
130 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940).
131 See generally BETTY KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND
TRUST MANAGEMENT (1989).
12 See supra note 34 (discussing deaf lawyer who represented a deaf student
in the Supreme Court).
133 See OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES 127-63 (1990).
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Are parents in any sensible sense representatives of their children?' 4
Or are parents people with interests separate and conflicting with their
children's interests and creating a need for independent representatives
for the children? Before you start to chuckle at the idea of a child bringing
her lawyer over to meet her parents, consider the problems posed when
parents seek to commit their children to mental hospitals, order them to
have an abortion, or seek to withhold medical treatment from them.
IV. INTERMISSION
Behind all the representation problems I have discussed, I see the
distrust of difference and the hope of empathy. These lie even deeper than
the concerns generated by "Miss Saigon" and law school hiring. Beneath
the clashing assertions of essential differences and meritocracy, and the
claims of reparations countered by hiring freedom, I believe, are our
common experiences: betrayal by those who claim to speak for us but do
not understand, and connection with those who often seem so different.
Law, at its best, cannot resolve such deep conflicts. Law can only manage
them, temporarily.
For something more insightful, we need art. I cannot help but think of
another contemporary play: "M. Butterfly."'135 Playwright David Henry
Hwang read a New York Times account about an actual affair between
a male French diplomat and a Chinese opera singer who appeared to be
a woman but was actually a man. According to the New York Times story,
the actual gender identity of the opera singer remained unknown to the
diplomat, and Hwang asked, how could this be? 36 In the news story, the
diplomat said he had never seen his Chinese lover naked and thought
"her" modesty reflected Chinese custom. Hwang explained his own bril-
liant chain of thought:
134 After longstanding tradition recognizing parents as representatives of their
children for purposes of litigation, the Supreme Court denied a group of African-
American parents standing to sue on behalf of their children who were denied
admission to private, tax-exempt schools. The Court reasoned in part that any
stigma due to racial discrimination could be challenged only by the individual
who was personally injured. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984).
131 It is the longest running straight play since "Amadeus". Kevin Kelly, M.
Butterfly, Miss Saigon, and Mr. Hwang, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1990, at 92.
131 Id. at 93. In this way, the play challenges the audience to think not only
about the gender of the character, but also the gender of the actor, and thus the
possibilities of cross-gender casting. Cross-gender casting, while uncommon, is
not without precedent. See Dan Sullivan, Colorblind Casting: It's Not Yet a Tra-
dition- When Black is White, Women are Men, And the Theater is Challenging,
LA TIMES, Oct. 2, 1988, Calendar Section, at 50.
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I thought, wait a minute here, that's not a Chinese custom? I
begin to think, maybe the guy had not fallen in love with an
actual person but with this sort of fantasy stereotype of the
Orient. I was driving along one day, somewhere, thinking, hey,
the diplomat thought he had found Madame Butterfly! I pulled
into a record store, bought Puccini's opera, looked at the li-
bretto, and, right there, in the store, I began to structure the
beginning of the play where the diplomat fantasizes that he's
Pinkerton and has found Butterfly. He realizes - by the end
- that he, himself, is, in fact, Butterfly. He's the one who has
been sacrificed for love, exploited by his lover, who turns out
to be a spy. Once I had all this, I knew I could start writing at
the beginning and go through to the end.'37
"M. Butterfly" teases the audience about the identity of the opera
singer. The playbill lists only the actor's last name and first initial to
keep the real person's sex a mystery. The play gradually, methodically,
and fantastically explores the projection of fantasy on what we think is
different; the projection of gender difference on top of racial and national
difference, in the midst of searching for human connection, and in the
midst of the jeopardy of betrayal. It is critical to the play that the audience
suspend disbelief about who is the opera singer, who is the diplomat, and
ultimately, who are we all, struggling to know and be known. As this
play opens possibilities for new understandings, it exemplifies represen-
tation: the representation of human experience, present and absent from
our consciousness. From Miss Saigon, to class actions, to M. Butterfly,
representation is changing even as it changes us.
137 Kelly, supra note 135, at 93.
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